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ARGUMENT 
I. TEMPORARY ORDERS SHOULD NOT BE GIVEN UNDUE 
WEIGHT IN SUBSEQUENT CUSTODY DETERMINATIONS. 
The standard for determining custody in this matter is simply the "best interests of 
the child." Boals v. Boals, 664 p.2d 1191, 1194 (Utah 1983). Gary Mathie was not 
required to show a "substantial change" in circumstances, or to show unfitness on the 
part of Ms. Gough. IdL All Gary Mathie had to show was simply that it was in the best 
interests of the minor child that he be granted custody. This standard was not applied 
because of the trial court's admission of irrelevant evidence and its placing inappropriate 
weight on the temporary custody determination. 
The purpose of a temporary order is to provide fast and easy resolution of 
complex issues. The orders are exactly what they are called, temporary, and are to have 
no impact on the parties' permanent status.1 Alimony and temporary support are 
routinely established, but it is contemplated by all parties that these amounts will change 
when the Decree of Divorce is entered. Temporary divisions of property are made, but 
can and often are altered in the Decree of Divorce. By allowing trial courts to use a 
temporary custody arrangement as the basis for establishing permanent custody, it has the 
effect of undermining the very purpose of such temporary orders, and flies in the very 
face of every other issue addressed and decided by such orders. 
l
"A temporary order is only that, temporary. It is effective only until a fully informed 
custody determination can be made at a final hearing. Temporary custody is not to be treated as 
permanent custody. " Tucker v. Tucker, 910 P.2d 1209 (Utah 1996). 
1 
As a practitioner faced with such issues on a daily basis, the position of Appellee, 
were it to be upheld by this Court, would substantially impact the advice and counsel I 
would give clients. Realizing that a contested and complicated divorce may drag out for 
years, it would border on malpractice to advise a client interested in custody to stipulate 
to such orders. I would be forced to garner all resources at my disposal, including the 
opinions of expert witnesses, to turn the hearing for a temporary order into as much of a 
trial setting as possible. This would undoubtedly burden the courts, and defeats the 
reasons for having temporary orders in the first place. I would perceive failure to get 
temporary custody as ultimately a failure to get permanent custody.2 
Although we do not dispute the broad discretion trial courts have in making such 
decisions, it is patent abuse of that discretion to rely upon temporary orders, often entered 
without substantive analysis by the preceding court, when making a permanent custody 
evaluation. There currently exists an incongruity in the law, which can and must be 
addressed. Cases like Tucker v. Tucker stand for the principle that temporary orders 
should not be given permanent status, and cites most of the above reasons as to why. 
The same opinion, as set forth in Appellant's brief, goes on to say that such arrangements 
"should not be ignored." The only guidance is that the trial court should not "abuse its 
2My observations and concerns are far from novel or unique. In Tucker, the Supreme 
Court of Utah recognized that "if a temporary order of custody were to be given permanent 
status...no party would ever stipulate to a temporary arrangement, and every hearing on 
temporary custody would involve the time-consuming presentation of witnesses, both expert and 
lay, as well as other types of evidence. In short, a temporary custody hearing would become a 
permanent custody hearing" Tucker, at 1216. 
2 
discretion" and that a trial court is "entitled to accord no more or no less significance to 
the existing custody arrangement than it deemed appropnate." Tucker at 1216 
This is, in practice, no standard at all. Trial courts, as happened to Gary Mathie, 
can and do use the temporary custody determination as the determinative factor m 
making custody decisions The abuse of discretion standard is so high, so nebulous, that 
the alleged limitation on the determinative weight given to temporary orders is a myth 
No attorney can adequately or even competently advise his client as to the later impact of 
a temporary order Should Gary Mathie lose this appeal as a great deal of the underlying 
case law would seem to indicate, then the only appropnate advice given a client would be 
to tight like a bulldog to get temporary custody, regardless of the cost and expense, 
because the alternative is to lose custody in the future This Court can and should set 
forth a rule that the substantive effect of temporary orders be given no weight at all m 
making permanent determinations, and that custody analyses focus solely upon the 
ielati\e fitness of the parents and the best interests of the child, regardless of prior 
custody determinations 
EL AT ALL TIMES RELEVANT TO THE CUSTODY 
DETERMINATION, APPELLANT ACTED APPROPRIATELY 
AND HAD NO CRIMINAL INVOLVEMENT. 
The trial court placed emphasis on the pnor cnmmal record of Gary Mathie when 
making a character determination with respect to the parties. This evidence is irrelevant, 
3 
unduly prejudicial, and should not have been admitted when making a custody 
determination. 
The only thing relevant to Mathie's fitness as a parent is his current behavior and 
his involvement with the child. To this, there is no dispute from the record below that 
Mathie is a fit parent, and has "cleaned up" his life since the birth of his child. Instead 
of using his prior bad acts against him, he should have been commended for the turn 
around he has made in his life, and seen as the example he can be for his young child. 
CONCLUSION 
This matter was briefed earlier by another attorney, and most of the substantive 
and factual issues were adequately addressed in the prior filings. The supporting case 
law is before this Court, and little to nothing can be added by my merely throwing 
additional cases into the mix. Coming late to the game, and learning of this case under 
circumstances similar to those of this Court, I would admit to being struck by the 
difficulty and complexity of the underlying issues presented in this matter. Trial courts 
are faced with difficult decisions when making child custody determinations, but being 
difficult cannot be allowed as an excuse for beins unfair. The determination below was 
and is unfair to Gary Mathie. 
On the one hand, the courts of this state have repeatedly stated that temporary 
orders are not permanent orders, and should not be relied upon as such. On the other 
4 
hand, trial courts are allowed to use this determination as long as it is not an "abuse of 
discretion." How can these two, apparently mutually exclusive standards, coexist? What 
is the standard for "abuse of discretion" under these circumstances? Is it even possible to 
articulate such a standard, or are we merely to rely upon the good judgment and 
discretion of trial court judges? It appears that the current state of the law in this area is 
confusing and contradictory, provides no predictive value, and is most certainly applied 
in vastly different manners throughout the state. 
What is undisputed is that there are two people who dearly love their child. Both 
were found fit to be parents, with one being awarded custody by the "slimmest of 
margins." R. at 235. What is also undisputed is that the trial court made this 
determination after relying heavily upon the temporary order, and that this was unfair and 
unjust to Gary Mathie. 
In conclusion, the only fair and just way to resolve this matter, and other matters 
similarly situated, would be to prohibit trial courts from applying any weight deriving 
from circumstances resulting from temporary orders when making permanent child 
custody determinations. 
DATED this .day of June, 1999. 
Joseph R. Goodman, Jr. 
Attorney for Plaintiff and Appellant, 
Gary Mathie 
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